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Cold 
by Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction  
Arms control may be coming in from the cold. The phrasing is appropriate, taken from one of the 
most famous Cold War novels by John Le Carré and made into one of the first successful Cold 
War spy movies, since arms control was birthed in the Cold War and, one can reasonably argue, 
helped keep it cold long enough for the West to win. With victory came a flurry of arms control 
activities that reached its zenith in the mid-1990s as both sides used the end of the conflict to 
codify lower numbers of forces and ensure that the war was really, truly over.  
By the late 1990s, however, arms control had lost its luster, as had arms control’s cousin, nuclear 
weapons, and both became less important to a national security stance that no longer recognized 
the importance of such weapons, or such policies (arms control), or even such strategies 
(deterrence) in the globalizing post-Cold War world. With the arrival of President George W. Bush 
and the attacks of September 11th that put the country on a war footing against a dramatically 
different kind of enemy, arms control seemed passé, if not dead. The Bush administration did all it 
could to make sure it stayed that way.[1]  
With the investiture of Barack Obama as president, the United States may find itself restoring the 
tool of arms control to its formerly central place in the toolbox of American diplomacy. Arms 
control—even nuclear arms control—may once again be seen as a legitimate activity of 
government after eight years wandering the wilderness. Even without the change in political 
philosophies heralded by the new administration, the agenda facing the new president in the next 
year and a half would require his renewed attention on this policy approach. Probably the most 
urgent policy consideration in this agenda will be what to do about the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START I,) set to expire in December 2009, and new talks with Russia for some sort of 
follow-on nuclear reduction treaty. Congress has mandated the preparation of a survey of 
strategic issues, as well as a Defense Department-drafted Nuclear Posture Review, both in 2009. 
And the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will hold its five-year review conference in 2010. 
This administration has already signaled that it intends to make deeper reductions in nuclear 
weapons—deployed or reserve, strategic or tactical—a centerpiece of its foreign policy, and the 
2010 NPT review conference will likely be a significant turning point for this policy.  
For these reasons, and others, the Obama administration finds itself facing the return of arms 
control. We can expect to see the administration making the effort to reinvigorate arms control 
organizations in both the State and Defense Departments to enhance the visibility of the 
approach, and to rebuild the diplomatic capacity to negotiate and carry out agreements in multiple 
arenas. Radical ideas in this arena may not carry much weight in what initially appears to be a 
relatively centrist cabinet for the Obama administration, but the core concepts of arms control and 
disarmament are falling on much more fertile soil than they have for the past eight years. As but 
one example, reference the following quotation from the Obama White House website under the 
category “foreign policy objectives:”  
Obama and Biden will… always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. 
But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will 
stop the development of new nuclear weapons, work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian 
ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert, seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons and material, and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-
range missiles so that the agreement is global.[2]  
As an aside, it is interesting from an academic point of view that the value of nuclear weapons 
and deterrence have fallen to such a low standing that they are seldom considered worthy of 
separate and distinct studies or analyses anymore. All recent studies on “arms control” have 
included sections on new nuclear weapons, the value and purpose of said weapons, and the role 
of missile defenses.  
Arms control was created and used in the Cold War as a tool for enhancing a state’s national 
security, regardless of the types of weapons systems, so this expansion of the concept of arms 
control to include nuclear weapons and strategic defenses is indeed illustrative and surprising. 
Today’s studies should more accurately be labeled examinations of strategic force structure and 
purpose, rather than arms control. Yet such is the linkage in the mind of today’s bureaucrats and 
even some academics that arms control, deterrence, nuclear weapons, and even missile 
defenses are conjoined in one intellectual muddle. Even the Obama White House lists what few 
arms control objectives it has under “foreign policy,” and then under the sub-heading “nuclear 
weapons,” rather than where I would argue they rightfully belong, under “defense policy.”  
Such widespread fuzzy thinking makes it difficult to sort out the real value or purpose of any one 
of these factors. It also reflects the view held in Europe for some time that nuclear weapons are 
no longer useable as military weapons, but only have a political purpose. Such has been NATO’s 
formal position since the early 1990s. And while that position has never been clearly appreciated 
by most analysts, it has served the purpose of keeping the Alliance united in supporting a minimal 
deterrent force stationed on the European Continent, though for what use, if any, nobody could 
tell you. The same future may be in store for U.S. nuclear weapons. But I digress.  
This paper shall attempt to focus on arms control, but given the nature of today’s thought 
processes on these subjects, it will also necessarily also touch on some of the other fields, as 
well.  
Specific Policy Pronouncements 
This section presents short overviews of the Obama administration’s publicly announced policy 
positions on a number of key arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues.[3] Overall, 
there appears to be more continuity than differences from the Bush administration, with three 
exceptions: the follow-on to START treaty, the possibility of CTBT treaty ratification, and the next 
level for continuing nuclear reductions.  
Nuclear Disarmament  
President Obama supports the Four Statesmen approach to gradual reductions to global zero in 
nuclear weapons stockpiles, as enunciated in their Wall Street Journal op-ed piece in January 
2007.[4] According to Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, some two-thirds of all living former Secretaries 
of State and Defense and National Security Advisors have signed on to this argument, so it would 
appear that the four have breathed new life into the old disarmament debate.[5] The Four 
Statesmen published a follow-up editorial in the same newspaper in January 2008, which 
included several actionable measures that they urged the world community, led by the United 
States, to take right away.[6] Three of these would appear nearly verbatim on the White House 
web page on Obama administration goals that stood up on 20 January 2009: “extend key 
verification and monitoring provision of the 1991 START treaty and further reductions as agreed 
to in the Moscow Treaty;” “increase warning time for launch of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles;” 
and “accelerate work on securing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials worldwide and helping 
other nations comply with UN Resolution 1540.”[7]  
More generally, “move toward a nuclear free world” is one of the administration’s key objectives. 
In response to a Council for a Livable World questionnaire during the campaign, Obama 
promised that: “As president, I will take the lead to work for a world in which the roles and risks of 
nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated.”[8] And in a similar questionnaire for 
the Arms Control Association, he stated that:  
As president, I will set a new direction in nuclear weapons policy and show the world that America 
believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to work to ultimately 
eliminate all nuclear weapons. I fully support reaffirming this goal, as called for by George Schultz, 
Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, as well as the specific steps they propose to 
move us in that direction.[9]  
He went on to say, “To make progress toward this goal, I will seek real, verifiable reductions in 
U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—whether deployed or nondeployed, whether strategic or 
nonstrategic—and work with other nuclear powers to reduce global stockpiles dramatically by the 
end of my presidency.”[10] This sounds like a sincere and strongly held policy position. Yet 
candidate Obama also made clear that “American will not disarm unilaterally. Indeed, as long as 
states retain nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent that is strong, 
safe, secure, and reliable.”[11] And President Obama, in his first weeks in office, was sober and 
cautious about repeating the rhetoric of immediate unilateral nuclear force reductions.  
Nuclear Force Structure  
Candidate Obama also made it quite clear that he would not authorize the development of new 
nuclear weapons. As a senator he voted against funding for the reliable replacement warhead 
(RRW). On the other hand, he did ask Robert Gates to remain in his cabinet as Secretary of 
Defense. Gates is known to favor the RRW program as necessary to ensure the reliability of the 
nuclear stockpile into the future, as he has recently written in Foreign Affairs.[12] The new 
president may not be categorically opposed to modernization of the nuclear enterprise.  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Follow-On  
The new administration has pledged to seek Russian agreement to extend the START I 
monitoring and verification provisions prior to the treaty’s expiration in December 2009. This will 
continue to serve as the verification protocol for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, 
also known as the Moscow Treaty) through its completion date of December 2012. Obama also 
promises to work with Russia to increase missile launch warning and decision times.[13] What 
this means remains to be seen, but relaxing nuclear force postures while retaining strategic 
stability and balance between the United States and Russia, and eventually between the United 
States, Russia, and others, is not as simple a proposition as some might have us believe. In fact, 
according to State Department personnel, the United States and Russia remain very far apart on 
a number of key issues related to further strategic arms reduction, making it unlikely that the two 
sides will be able to negotiate a new treaty by December 2009. As a result, they were saying 
early in the Obama administration, the most likely outcome this year will be a simple extension of 
the existing treaty so as not to lose the verification measures associated with START that are 
needed for the Moscow Treaty.  
Apparent desire by the Obama administration to improve relations with Russia on a more general 
level, however, may result in commitments to resolve this issue sooner rather than later. U.S.-
Russian relations took a major step in that direction on 1 April 2009 when Presidents Obama and 
Dmitri Medvedev, meeting at the G-20 summit in London, agreed to begin immediate negotiations 
to achieve a follow-on to START treaty ready for signature by July 2009 and ratification by the 
December end date for START I. Obama also pledged to push for the ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the U.S. Senate. Senator Richard Lugar, a senior Republican 
advocate of arms control, called the agreement “truly remarkable… almost breathless in its 
optimism and scope.”[14]  
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)  
Strengthening the NPT regime is the second key objective for the new administration listed on the 
White House web page. In September 2008 Obama was quoted as saying that “I will show the 
world that America believes in its existing commitment under the NPT to ultimately eliminate all 
nuclear weapons.”[15]  
Globalizing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty  
Referring to the 1987 INF Treaty between the United States and Russia, the new president has 
stated that he will “set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so 
that the agreement is global.”[16] No more specifics have been proffered publicly, but this has 
been a long-standing goal of the disarmament community, and one supported by the Russian 
government.  
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons  
According to the Ploughshares Monitor, candidate Obama agreed to “start a dialogue, including 
within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating nuclear weapons designed for forward 
deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and 
for their eventual elimination.”[17] Coupled with the comment from his Arms Control Today 
interview about wanting to control all nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, this suggests 
a much broader nuclear arms control agenda than previously attempted.[18] This desire to 
include non-strategic nuclear weapons runs up against current NATO policy as expressed in the 
Alliance Strategic Concept of 1999 (currently being updated for release in 2010), which places 
the Alliance’s ultimate deterrent on the nuclear weapons of the three NATO nuclear states: Great 
Britain, France, and the United States. Should the United States choose to remove any remaining 
U.S. nuclear weapons from forward deployment in Europe, NATO may be faced with an 
“agonizing reappraisal” of its defense requirements and ability to rely on American extended 
deterrence—or, more simply, it could choose to rely on U.S. off-shore forces, as the United 
States currently provides for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other allies. Still, the loss of visible 
American weapons on European soil would require an adjustment on the part of NATO. 
Furthermore, Russia will have little incentive to bargain away those American bombs in exchange 
for its much larger cache of non-strategic nuclear weapons.[19]  
The United States extends its nuclear deterrent umbrella over more than just NATO. In a world of 
fewer nuclear weapons alliances and extended deterrence guarantees will become much more 
meaningful. With smaller numbers, and possibly with fewer options for nuclear forces within these 
numbers, the concept of extending U.S. deterrence to friends and allies around the globe may 
one day come into doubt. This too may lead to unintended or unanticipated consequences.  
De-Alerting  
Candidate Obama pointed out that while President Bush had campaigned on a pledge in 2000 to 
remove nuclear weapons from their ready to launch status, he failed to do so once in office. 
President Obama claims that he will work with Moscow make these changes to “outdated Cold 
War policies” in order to reduce the risk of catastrophic accident or miscalculation.[20] Not 
everyone agrees that this is a problem, however, and there is debate over whether the solutions 
carry acceptable costs.  
Removing prompt responding systems like ICBMs from alert may be more art than science. Very 
prompt systems were postured the way they were in the Cold War for good reasons. Those 
reasons rested not on the merits of the system, but rather squarely on the state of the underlying 
relationship between the parties. While the Cold War is over, there are many who are not yet 
convinced the relationship between the United States and Russia has reached a state where de-
alerting is possible. Further, de-alerting, which imposes delays in these prompt systems and 
could, if miscalculated, lead to the operational loss of that system, requires stronger means of 
verification, particularly in a world of fewer nuclear weapons and delivery systems.  
De-Posturing  
In a new twist, candidate Obama sated in his Arms Control Today interview that “I will also 
immediately stand down all nuclear forces to be reduced under the Moscow Treaty and urge 
Moscow to do the same.”[21] The latest publicly released numbers placed the U.S. arsenal of 
deployed strategic warheads a year ago at 3,000 to 3,500, or about where they would have been 
if the START II treaty had entered into force. Unverified reports say that the United States is well 
ahead of schedule in reducing its arsenal to meet Moscow Treaty limits, and may have already 
reached the treaty agreed level of 2,200 warheads—making the United States compliant with the 
treaty nearly four years early.[22] Even if we are not at that level yet, President Obama’s 
statement implies that shortly after entering office the number of operationally deployed strategic 
delivery weapons may drop to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 called for in the SORT treaty.  
As with de-alerting, shrinking forces to these levels at an accelerated pace will require strong 
verification of reciprocal actions. Without reciprocity, or the ability to confidently ensure that these 
forces are not seen as threatening in a world where small numbers of nuclear weapons are 
consequential to stability and deterrence calculations, de-posturing will be a challenge.  
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Loose Nukes  
The Obama campaign committed to securing all loose nuclear weapon materials around the 
world in the first four years of his term, a promise he reiterated on the White House web page 
listing his foreign policy objectives, and again at his first news conference after taking office on 9 
February 2009.[23] He also pledged to work with Russia and other countries to create and 
implement a comprehensive set of standards to protect materials from theft, phase out the use of 
highly enriched uranium from the civil power industry, and convene a summit on nuclear terrorism. 
Taken together, this category alone certainly represents a major undertaking, but one with 
multiple levels of potential payback if done properly. One can presume this means continued 
support for the multiplicity of existing bilateral and multinational programs meant to achieve this 
result, primarily run by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy.[24]  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  
President Obama was not in the Senate for the first vote to ratify the CTBT in 1997, but he has 
vowed to make ratification a central policy goal of his administration. From the Arms Control 
Today questionnaire he states: “I will reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the 
CTBT at the earliest practical date and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring onboard other 
states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.”[25]  
Secretary Gates however, in response to a question in October 2008, threw some cold reality 
onto the discussion about the CTBT. The treaty failed to achieve Senate advise and consent in 
1997, he said, because of doubts about its verifiability. Secretary Gates indicated he didn’t 
oppose the treaty, but believed the verifiability concerns of the Senate needed to be addressed. 
The global network of sensors put in place by the CTBT Organization over the past 12 years and 
its proven capabilities may overturn some earlier congressional skepticism about the ability to 
truly verify a comprehensive test ban.  
Whether verifiability of the CTBT is a real concern or a canard for those seeking a reason not to 
vote for it is debatable, however: with 59 or 60 Democrats in the Senate in 2009, versus a 
Republican majority in 1997, there is a possibility this Senate may not see verifiability as the 
same obstacle as in the past. With some of the more hawkish Senate Republicans from a decade 
ago now out of office, and many more chastened, it is conceivable that enough Senators may 
cross the aisle in the spirit of bipartisanship and pass this treaty without the changes Secretary 
Gates believes necessary. They are likely to get their chance to do so in 2009 since the president 
announced his desire to see the treaty ratified as part of the U.S.-Russian strategic agreement at 
the London G-20 Summit.[26]  
Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty  
President Obama has called for a “global effort to negotiate a verifiable treaty ending the 
production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.” He has also called upon other interested 
governments to join with the United States in establishing a global nuclear energy architecture.[27]  
Missile Defenses  
It is unclear why today’s national security community insists on including missile defenses in 
categories like nuclear weapons, except for the juxtaposition of strategic defenses with strike 
forces as two legs of the new strategic triad introduced in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. 
Nonetheless, there is a historical case for combining these categories. The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) of the 1960s started out as discussions of offenses and defenses within 
the context of nuclear forces.  
While the new administration’s plans are uncertain, particularly how they intend to tie missile 
defenses to strategic offense discussions, President Obama has said that while he supports 
missile defenses in principle, he wants to delay further deployments of any system until it has 
proven workable. (Presumably if it proves unworkable, it could still be useful as an arms control 
bargaining chip, as were the ABM systems of the 1960s).  
This is also true of a third missile site in Europe, which the president might oppose on political 
grounds if the development process appeared likely to cause a split between Old Europe and 
New Europe. On the other hand, given allied support President Obama may choose to go ahead 
and deploy European-based U.S. missile defenses.  
The president also stated that he wants to increase the warning and decision times for the launch 
of nuclear armed ballistic missiles, thereby further reducing the risk of miscalculation in response 
to an accidental or small scale rogue strike.[28] Presumably this is yet another end of the thread 
that weaves through the previous discussion about de-alerting prompt delivery systems.  
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  
Candidate Obama promised to expand PSI from its current focus on stopping illicit nuclear 
shipments to a broader goal of eliminating nuclear black market networks. Analysts are busy 
contemplating ways and means to expand the PSI beyond what’s been done in the past, and a 
fresh look by a new president may be just what is needed for PSI. PSI started off dramatically, but 
more recently is having a less noticeable effect on proliferation. There could be a number of 
reasons for this. Perhaps proliferator networks are not shipping as much WMD-related material 
as they used to. Or they are choosing shipping modes that are harder to intercept. Or they’re 
getting better at avoiding detection.  
Space Arms Control  
In addition to points made about missile defenses, the Obama administration has made it clear 
that it will maintain American leadership on space issues, and will seek “a worldwide ban on 
weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites.”[29]  
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)  
The new president has expressed support for “international initiatives to limit harm to civilians 
caused by conventional weapons,” including land mines, anti-aircraft missiles, small and light 
arms, and cluster munitions.[30] However, given the large slate of topics already on his plate, the 
chances of the new administration focusing on these supposedly “lesser evils” may be slim.  
South Asia 
Senator Obama voted in favor of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, though he also voted for restrictive 
caveats. He supported the Hyde Act, meant to reduce incentives in South Asia for either side to 
test and deploy new nuclear weapons. Achieving his goal of ratifying the CTBT, he hopes, will 
have a calming effect on the region, as well. And he promises help in resolving he underlying 
Kashmir crisis.[31] This alone could occupy any president for eight years.  
Northeast Asia 
President Obama supports restoring military and laboratory exchanges with China to show them 
that “we are not enemies.”[32] He applauds efforts made by the Bush administration to sustain a 
dialogue on strategic nuclear issues. With respect to North Korea, President Obama has pledged 
direct and aggressive diplomacy with Pyongyang. Here again, another undertaking that in and of 
itself could occupy an administration for a long, long time.  
Iran 
President Obama has promised to open direct dialogue with Tehran. But he has also made it 
clear that Iran must suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and is willing to support tough UN 
or international sanctions on Iran, and even military options, if necessary, to get Iran to stop.[33] 
He reiterated these points in his 9 February 2009 press conference. Yet aside from offering 
dialogue, it is difficult at this point to see what’s different in this arena. Time will most certainly tell.  
Recommendations from Outside Organizations  
Given the new administration’s policy positions enumerated above, a number of organizations 
that advocate arms control and disarmament are feeling their oats as the new president takes 
office. Many of these groups published reports, studies, open letters to the president, and email 
suggestions as 2008 turned into 2009 and President Obama took office. Here are a few of the 
more interesting suggestions derived from this fairly large body of literature.[34]  
Strategic Issues  
Several organizations call on the new president to chart a new direction in nuclear policy, 
emphasizing minimum deterrence so that the United States can continue to lead the way toward 
even greater reductions in its stockpile. They suggest that he announce this new vision in time to 
inform the framers of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. They also suggest he begin negotiations 
with all other nuclear powers and potential adversaries to determine which levels of (lower) 
nuclear weapons numbers make sense to all concerned. Some suggest that we extend START 
and begin negotiations with Russia toward a next step of 1,500 or even 1,000 deployed strategic 
warheads by each party. Others have suggested unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions to 1,000 total 
warheads, based primarily at sea. Regarding de-alerting, several studies say to “just do it,” in the 
process making any re-targeting a minimum 24-hour process to allow time for reflection in a crisis.  
On the CTBT, the new administration will have to conduct some re-education of the Senate as to 
the value of the treaty to the United States, as well as the technological progress made in 
monitoring technologies to detect cheating since the treaty was first considered over a decade 
ago. It remains to be seen whether this Senate or this Secretary of Defense will object to CTBT 
ratification again because of concerns about verifiability.  
With respect to the NPT, the real issue is how to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. 
Most studies suggest that the United States finally commit to the “Thirteen Steps” that were 
agreed upon at the 1995 Review Conference and reconfirmed at the 2000 gathering. Many states 
see arms reductions by the P5 nuclear powers as one measurable element in building the 
political good will to advance the agenda to strengthen the NPT regime. (When you consider that 
many of the people in the United States who will be making the decision about whether to adhere 
to these steps were also in office when we committed to it in 1995, I would suggest this is pretty 
likely.)  
Several articles have appeared on both sides of the issue of space arms control and space 
dominance. The debate is ongoing as to the importance of this new strategic high ground, and 
whether U.S. interests would be best served with or without arms control restrictions on military 
operations in space. The new administration has come down in favor of both: U.S. superiority in 
the region, and agreements to limit weapons in space that can threaten satellites.  
Finally, most advocates applaud the president’s goal of securing all fissile materials within four 
years. Some of them oppose the use of plutonium as a civil fuel source. And all agree that it is 
time to make countering nuclear terrorism the number one priority of the U.S. government, finally 
getting the United States to comport with the international consensus that the time has come to 
make all activities related to loose nuclear weapons and materials illegal.  
Dealing with Other States  
Most advocates concur with the announced Obama plan to negotiate with Iran without the 
condition that Tehran first suspend its uranium enrichment activities. They believe the White 
House should appoint a special envoy with the charge of improving U.S. relations with Russia, 
and coordinate with them to institute some of the recommendations suggested by Alexei Arbatov 
and Rose Gottemoeller in their 2008 article.[35]  
 
 
Other Issues  
The U.S. State Department, says one study, should be reorganized to restore the importance of 
arms control. Perhaps the government should consider recreating the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency to replace the independent organization that existed from 1961 to 1998. 
One challenge in doing so, of course, will be finding the people with enough expertise to manage 
these issues. As in the case of the nuclear enterprise and other strategic issues, there are very 
few experts left who remember how to do this. This is perhaps good news for defense contractors, 
with their large staffs of experts who formerly served in government or the military services 
dealing with nuclear, strategic, or arms control issues. But it will be challenging for the current 
administration to find and place all those people.  
Conclusion  
It would appear that arms control is, indeed, back. For more than a generation arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union stood for traditional diplomacy, before falling off the radar 
screen for a decade during the waning years of the Clinton presidency and the entirety of the 
Bush administration. In parallel, as the importance of nuclear weapons decreased, so, seemingly, 
did the value of arms control, tainted as it was as a Cold War vestige. That thinking, it turns out, 
was faulty. Arms control still has a role to play in helping enhance a state’s national security. And 
long-dormant thoughts of global nuclear disarmament are experiencing something of a 
renaissance, as well.  
As some authors point out, even with a return of arms control we are unlikely to see a return to 
long, drawn-out negotiations leading to complex formal treaties. More likely will be cooperative 
security arrangements and executive agreements, which are simpler to create and easier to 
implement. These agreements may even be ad hoc and informal, allowing states and interested 
non-state actors to respond in a manner they deem fitting. We can also expect to see a shift from 
traditional agreements that limit state actions, to new types of arrangements that require states to 
take action in pursuit of a common good (such as UNSCR 1540’s call for securing fissile 
materials to prevent nuclear terrorism). If the Obama administration can induce a renewed spirit 
of innovation and urgency, the world may become motivated to more directly combat the 
trafficking of the most dangerous materials.[36]  
There are today multiple deliberative processes underway examining the United States’ strategic 
posture, forces, and requirements: decisions on what to do about START extension or 
replacement; the Congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Commission of 2009, which will in 
turn tee up the Nuclear Posture Review; and preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 
which could push issues over CTBT, FMCT, and RRW to the forefront. At the same time, the 
United States military and its supporting nuclear enterprise must make decisions on near-term 
stockpile levels. And strategic partners like Russia are trying to link all these issues to broader 
concerns over the third ballistic missile site in Europe and U.S. development of conventional 
prompt global strike capabilities.[37]  
But this is an optimistic period for arms control and disarmament advocates. As one recent study 
put it, “the agenda which the president-elect has set out is built around key actions that the 
disarmament community has been urging for a long time. The very fact that these actions will now 
find sympathy in the new White House is worth celebrating.”[38] We shall see. The issues are 
vitally important, but it may take some serious resuscitation to restore the vitality of arms control 
as a diplomatic tool worthy of the struggle. Those of us who have waited through the lean years 
for a return of this noble concept applaud the effort.  
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